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Abstract: 
 
When a state in a diplomatic crisis with a rival mobilizes its military, it pays in advance 
some of the costs of fighting a war, since military movements are a necessary 
precondition to fighting.  Sinking costs into war during negotiation alters the bargaining 
environment.  This is because the set of possible negotiated outcomes mutually-preferred 
to war is determined by the joint costs of war, and part of the cost of war is military 
mobilization.  Mobilization sinks some of those costs for the mobilizing state, reducing 
the remaining marginal costs of war, thereby reducing the set of possible negotiated 
settlements.  A state that mobilizes its military will need a larger negotiated concession 
from a rival in order to induce it not to fight.  With imperfect information, the cost-
sinking effects of mobilization can cancel out any informational benefits that 
mobilization may have as a way of signaling resolve.  The probability of bargaining 
breakdown and war can be influenced by the relative value of mobilization and fighting 
costs, but the direction of the effect is sensitive to different assumptions. 
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States with conflicting interests know that if they fail to reach a settlement they 
could end up fighting a war.  Naturally, then, their beliefs about what is likely to happen 
in case of war influence what sort of agreement would be necessary to avert the war.  
This goes further than their beliefs about which side is likely to “win” the war, since 
states incur costs when they fight wars, and their expectations about wars – and by 
extension the negotiations they become involved in when they seek to avert wars – 
include their beliefs about those costs. 
  Typically scholars think of the cost of war as a lump sum.  I decompose the costs 
of war into two parts: a mobilization cost and a fighting cost.  Before states actually fight 
a war, they engage in a costly escalation process.  They may mobilize in a conscious 
attempt to signal their resolve, or they may mobilize because they expect that they may 
soon be fighting – the specific motive is unimportant.  What is important is that in this 
process of escalation the states pay some of the costs of war: a down payment on an 
investment in violence.   
There is a period of time after a crisis has begun but before a war starts when the 
parties could still avert a war through what we sometimes call “eleventh-hour 
diplomacy.”  The process of mobilizing for war impacts the chances for eleventh-hour 
diplomacy in two ways.  First, when a state chooses to escalate a military crisis, it 
provides some information about its preferences to its rival.  Presumably, then, this 
additional information may help states in conflict to find a negotiated settlement that they 
prefer to war.  This consequence of signaling is well-understood. 
Second, however, escalation has another consequence: in the process of escalating 
a crisis, a state pays some part of the total costs of fighting the war – all of the costs 
associated with mobilization rather than the actual fighting.  At this point, these war costs 
are sunk; this changes the remaining marginal costs of further escalation.  The result is 
perverse: the information that escalation provides may itself be rendered obsolete by the 
very process (escalation) that provides it.  Not only that, but since the escalating state’s 
marginal costs to future escalation are now reduced it will demand even more 
concessions from its rival.  The probability of bargaining breakdown and war can be 
influenced by the relative value of mobilization and fighting costs, but the direction of the  
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effect is sensitive to different assumptions. 
  I proceed in three sections.  First, I explain in ordinary terms, using an informal 
model, how the logic of sunk costs in war preparations influences crisis bargaining 
behavior.  Second, I describe a formal treatment.  Third, I discuss some of the 
implications and conclude. 
 
Argument 
 
  Consider two rational and unitary states involved in a dispute that has the 
potential to escalate to war.  Each state has a reservation price – that is, the minimum it 
can receive in a bargain in order to make such a bargain preferable to fighting a war.  
This reservation price will be based on a combination of the state’s estimate of the 
probable outcome of fighting and the cost of the war to the state.  In models of crisis 
bargaining based on these assumptions the key to resolving the crisis is information.  
That is, if the two states have similar enough estimates of the likely outcome of a 
potential war and similar enough estimates of their individual costs of fighting, then they 
will be able to agree on a negotiated settlement that averts the war (Bueno de Mesquita, 
Morrow, Siverson, and Smith, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick, 1997; 
Kilgour and Zagare, 1991; Morrow, 1989).   
The joint cost of war creates a window, a range of possible negotiated solutions 
that both of the states individually prefer to war.  The costs of war determine the size of 
this window, so for example a war that would be highly costly for both sides creates a 
large window of preferred potential negotiable settlements, while if the joint cost of war 
is small, the range of possible negotiated settlements is smaller (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 
1996). 
  In existing models the cost of war is a single payment that the state makes at the 
time that the fighting occurs.  I decompose this war cost into two different costs: fighting 
costs and mobilization costs. 
Fighting costs:  These are the costs that the state pays that are immediately and 
necessarily related to the actual use of violence on the battlefield.  For each side, these 
costs include the lives of its soldiers that are killed, the cost of weapons they discharge  
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and cannot reuse, and the cost of property that is destroyed.  So, for example, a state’s 
battle deaths or destruction to a state’s cities are costs of fighting.   
Mobilization costs:  These are all of the costs of war that states pay, either up-
front or by commitment, in the process of preparing for a war up to the instant that the 
war actually starts (that is, the last instant by definition in which the states could reach an 
agreement that averts war).  These include the costs of moving soldiers and equipment to 
the battlefield as well as the costs of moving them back home, since regardless of 
whether any fighting actually occurs the military forces will have to return eventually.  
There are both the direct costs of military deployment but also the opportunity costs, 
either in forgone opportunities to deploy military forces elsewhere or the lost productivity 
of labor and capital in civilian activities.  These costs also include all of the political costs 
of creating an international coalition, for example calling on allies for support and 
negotiating cooperative agreements on the technical aspects of deploying forces, such as 
overflight and basing rights.  There are also potential domestic political costs and 
opportunity costs, if leaders have to sacrifice other political goals or make side-payments 
to opposition groups in order to sustain a coalition to support fighting.   
In some instances, mobilization costs may be a relatively small part of overall war 
costs.  In the extreme case, a state that fights a war entirely in its own territory and that 
uses a standing army without raising additional forces has quite low mobilization costs.  
In contrast, its fighting costs may be much higher, especially if its population and 
property are at risk of destruction in the fighting. 
Sometimes, though, a state’s mobilization costs can be a large part of the overall 
costs of war.  Consider a great power entering a conflict against a distant and weaker 
state.  Examples here include the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas War or the 
United States in the 1991 Gulf War or the 2001 war in Afghanistan.  In each of these 
wars, the U.S. and the U.K. paid substantial mobilization costs, both in terms of moving 
military forces to the other side of the world and in terms of securing the acquiescence of 
skeptical allies.  In the U.S. cases, the Americans had to make costly arrangements with 
countries in the region – Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – on the technical aspects of 
deploying forces.  These arrangements were costly in terms of other American goals (see 
Lake, 1999, on the Gulf War) and were also costly in the sense that they risked triggering  
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potentially violent regime changes in these states that would bring anti-American 
governments into power.  The technical requires of mobilization, furthermore, required 
the United States essentially to pay these costs before any fighting started.  In the 
Falklands/Malvinas and Gulf War cases, the U.S. and Britain faced reluctant domestic 
audiences as well.   
In contrast, in each of these three instances the actual fighting produced little 
direct cost (relative to mobilization costs) since the fighting did not occur on the 
homeland territory and U.S. and British casualties were relatively low. 
As an example, consider the American military involvement in Iraq beginning in 
March 2003.  Although costs, both mobilization and fighting, are measures of subjective 
costs that states bear in relation to the underlying value of the issue at stake in a rivalry, 
ex ante estimates of the budgetary costs of mobilization and fighting may give an 
impression about the general relationship between mobilization and fighting costs.  In 
September 2002 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost of deploying a 
force to the Persian Gulf, above the cost of regular operations, would range between $9 
billion and $13 billion, while the cost of returning that force back to the United States 
(whether it was actually used in combat or not) would range between $5 billion and $7 
billion.  This yields a total mobilization cost between $14 and $20 billion.  Combat 
hostilities would cost from $6 billion to $9 billion per month.  Assuming a three-month 
war, fighting costs range from $18 to $27 billion (CBO, 2002).  These estimates suggest 
that mobilization costs would be in the neighborhood of 40% of the total costs of war.  
(Other estimates of the costs of a war against Iraq produce different results, both for 
budgeted military expenditures, as in House Budget Committee, Democratic Staff, 2002, 
and for the country as a whole, as in Leigh, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz, 2003.) 
So in a crisis between two states, where the crisis has the potential to escalate to 
war, they negotiate in a way that is informed by their expectations of the costs and 
probable outcome of fighting – what Powell (1996) calls bargaining under the shadow of 
power.  Consider a simple representation of a crisis bargaining situation taken from 
Powell.   
 [Figure 1 about here.] 
Suppose the two states are in conflict over the division of some asset, such as  
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territory, that can be stylized as a line segment as in Figure 1.  The line can be divided at 
any point along it, such that state A (on the left side) gets everything to the left of the 
point of division and state B (on the right side) gets everything to the right.  Each state 
prefers having more territory to having less territory.  The states have a common 
probability estimate P that represents that states’ expectations about what the probable 
outcome of a war will be.  P can represent the likely division of the line after fighting; 
alternatively it can represent the probability that one of the states will completely 
vanquish the other and take all of the territory.  In either case, the states bargain with each 
other in an effort to prevent war knowing that war will lead to an expected payoff 
determined by P.   
The other component of the expected payoff of war is the cost of fighting.  Since 
the cost of war is defined in proportion to the value of the good over which the states are 
in conflict, war costs are subjective to the states.  That is, how much does each state value 
its potential losses from violence relative to the issue at stake?   
Typically, models such as this one use one term, C, to represent for each state its 
cost of fighting.  I will here, however, divide this into two terms for one of the states, so 
that while B’s cost of war is simply C I will divide A’s cost of war into two components: 
M, the costs of military mobilization for A, and F, the costs of fighting for A.
1  So, the 
total cost of war for state A is M+F.  Prior to any mobilization by A, the states both know 
that war will cost it the mobilization cost and the fighting cost.  As Figure 1 shows, the 
sums of these two costs reduce A’s payoff from fighting; that is, in case of a war, A gets 
the division of the territory that results from the war minus the mobilization and fighting 
costs of the war.  Likewise, B gets whatever value it receives from control of the territory 
to the right of P, minus the costs of war for B (which I assume includes both the cost of 
mobilization and fighting).  So, taken together, P-F-M represents state A’s payoff from 
fighting, while P+C represents the inverse of state B’s payoff from fighting.  (In order to 
make the payoffs consistent with the figure, think of the line segment as a range of 
positive numbers from 0 on the far left to 1 on the far right, so a higher value of P means 
less territory for B.) 
                                                                        
1 To simplify the discussion and picture, and later the model, I will only disaggregate the 
war costs into mobilization and fighting for one of the two sides in the dispute.    
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The range between P-F-M and P+C is therefore the bargaining range.  Between 
these two points lie all of the possible negotiated settlements that both states would prefer 
to agree to instead of fighting.  One of the states would rather fight than agree to any 
point outside of this range. 
  Suppose the states have some mechanism of making offers to each other, in an 
attempt to reach a negotiated settlement over the division of the territory.  A might make 
an offer which B can either accept or reject, and vice versa.  If the states hit upon a 
proposal they mutually prefer to war, then they can live in peace under the settlement.  If 
they do not reach an agreement, they fight. 
  Note that neither state wants to make too generous of an offer to the other, since 
each values owning territory.  Powell (1996) shows that if the states have poor 
information about each other’s cost of fighting, then they can fail to reach a bargain.   
In order to illustrate, let me be specific: suppose that B has the chance to make a 
proposal to A.  Suppose that B knows the value of C, its own cost of fighting, and P, the 
likely outcome of a war.  Suppose, however, that it does not know A’s subjective 
valuation of A’s own costs of fighting – its resolve.  B may have guesses or beliefs about 
these costs, but it is unsure.  In this situation, B, in trying to get the best possible deal for 
itself, may offer A less than A would be willing to accept. 
  [Figure 2 about here.] 
  Suppose that that is, in fact, what happens at first.  That is, suppose that B makes 
a proposal to A that A finds unacceptable, since A would prefer fighting to accepting a 
bad (from its perspective) bargain.  In the top picture in Figure 2, I show just this.     
  As a result, the states are unable at this point to reach an agreement.  So, the first 
round of negotiations ends in failure.  The states prepare for war.  That is, A mobilizes its 
military and thereby pays its mobilization cost of war.  At the same time, the states enter 
a new phase of crisis diplomacy: last-minute negotiations to try to avert fighting. 
  The bottom picture shows the consequences of mobilization on the bargaining 
environment.  There are two effects of mobilization, which I will call a signaling effect 
and a cost-sinking effect. 
Signaling effect:  When a state mobilizes, its adversary learns something about it.  
That is, B knows that A rejected its proposal, and it therefore learns that the proposal was  
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outside of the bargaining range made up by the joint costs of war around the expected 
outcome P (the area enclosed by the bracket in the picture on top).  Specifically, B now 
may begin to think that in order to make a proposal to which A will agree it will have to, 
at a minimum, make an offer than was more generous than the one it had made in the first 
round.  (I address the possibility of bluffing in the next section.)  So, consistent with 
existing models of signaling in crisis bargaining, a state can use mobilization to cause an 
adversary to make a more generous offer than it would otherwise by showing it that the 
state is not a pushover.  Note that signaling can help states avoid negotiation breakdowns 
and war.  The more information states can credibly reveal to each other about the types of 
settlements they would prefer to fighting, the more able they will be to coordinate on a 
negotiated settlement.   
Cost-sinking effect:  The second consequence of mobilization is to reduce A’s 
marginal costs of war.  Since the cost of military mobilization is now sunk, A does not 
consider those costs of war when it returns to the bargaining table for one final attempt at 
a settlement.  So, the bargaining space around P is now smaller than it was initially.  
Although B has learned about places that the win-set – the set of agreements mutually-
preferred to fighting – is not located as a result of the signaling effect, in the process the 
target has become smaller as a result of the cost-sinking effect. 
Fearon (1997) distinguishes between two types of costly signals that states can 
send.  One type creates audience costs and punishes political leaders if they do not carry 
out a threat.  Another type sinks costs; this type of signal is the one that I describe here.  
In his model, though, the good over which the states are in dispute is not divisible.  His 
analysis therefore does not consider the dynamic that I explore, which is that as a state 
sinks its war costs by mobilizing its military, the minimum concession it will accept as an 
alternative to war increases; this is only meaningful given a divisible good.  In my terms, 
Fearon’s model isolates only the signaling consequence of mobilization and not the cost-
sinking consequence. 
Other existing models of signaling (Schultz, 1998; Smith 1998a) use what Fearon 
calls signals that generate audience costs and do not consider signals that, like the ones I 
consider, sink costs into war through mobilization.  This focus on audience-cost signaling 
is reasonable, given Fearon’s (1997) conclusion that states may be better off choosing to  
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send signals involving audience costs than signals involving sinking costs.   
My question, though, on the effects of mobilization on crisis bargaining is still 
relevant.  Even if states never use military mobilization solely as a signal, it is still 
worthwhile to study the consequences of mobilization since states mobilize when they 
expect to fight (Lai, 2001).  Mobilization comes before the fighting starts, so in principle 
states always have the potential to reach a negotiated settlement after they mobilize but 
before they fight.  Even states that choose to send a signal of the audience-cost variety 
may still find themselves mobilizing at some point in the crisis.
2 
In this respect, although I frame the story in a limited way about mobilization, my 
argument is as much about the conduct of negotiations in war as it is about bargaining 
before a war.  As several authors have noted recently, bargaining continues after war 
states, and war processes influence international bargaining (Gartner, 1998).  Wagner 
(2000) notes that bargaining continues after war starts in a way that can change the terms 
of settlement.  Smith (1998b) models state behavior during wars, but his focus is on the 
domestic electoral process.  He also combines the issue at stake with power resources, so 
that if a state gains more territory it gets more of a military advantage.  Once states fight 
the initial stages of a war, they can still negotiate over a settlement.  To the extent that 
early fighting sinks costs, the negotiating environment will have been changed by the act 
of fighting.   
 
A formal model 
 
  In the game, two states, A and B, bargain over the distribution of some good.  If 
they reach a settlement they live with whatever deal they have struck, if not they fight a 
                                                                        
2 I could complicate the model I use here two further assumptions that might make it 
more realistic.  One is that mobilizing could by itself create domestic audience costs for a 
leader, and the other is that mobilization sooner rather than later could give a state a 
military advantage that would either make the outcome of fighting more favorable to the 
state or reduce its fighting costs.  These two are, essentially, equivalent.  However, they 
blur the distinction between cost-sinking and audience costs, but I hope to show the 
independent effects of cost-sinking.   
  9 
war.  For simplicity, I make the game one-sided, with state A choosing whether or not to 
mobilize its military and state B choosing how much of a concession to make to A. 
 
  Structure of the game 
At the first node, Nature makes a move, choosing some parameters.  In the 
complete information version of the game, this move is trivial since I assume that the 
parameters are known to both states; in different incomplete information versions Nature 
draws different parameters and reveals these to state A but not state B.  I describe these 
different versions later.   
[Figure 3 about here.] 
At node 2, state B offers A a deal.  This deal, D2, can be any real number.  A 
positive value for the deal means that B offers A something, while a negative value 
means that B demands something; in the logic that follows the distinction is unimportant 
(although the story is more intuitive when the deal is a positive number – a concession). 
At node 3, A decides whether or not to accept the deal that B has offered.  If A 
rejects the deal, it mobilizes its military and the states proceed to node 4.  If A accepts the 
deal, then the two states live under its terms. 
At node 4, state B has a chance to make A another offer.  Here, B offers D4, 
which can be any real number.   
Finally, at node 5 A can either fight or, by not fighting, accept B’s new offer.  
Fighting results in a transfer of P from B to A; as with D, P is any real number, so that if 
P is negative it represents a transfer from A to B. 
If the states end up fighting, A’s payoff is P-M-F.  That is, A gets a division of the 
good P.  In fighting, A pays both a mobilization cost M and a fighting cost F.  B’s cost 
from fighting is -P-C, since it loses P to A and C represents the cost of fighting to B.  
Assume that M, F, and C are all greater than 0. 
If A accepts B’s offer D2, then A’s payoff is D2 and B’s payoff is –D2.  If A 
accepts B’s offer D4, after A has already mobilized, then A’s payoff is D4-M and B’s 
payoff is –D4.  
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Game with complete information 
Since the players have no uncertainty, the game can be solved with backwards 
induction.  At node 5 A chooses to accept B’s offer if D4-M > P-M-F, which reduces to 
D4 > P-F.   
At node 4, B wants to make the smallest offer to A that it can get away with – the 
smallest offer that A will take rather than fight.  B’s choice will be to set D4 to be a trivial 
amount greater than P-F, a deal that is, for A, a trivial amount better than what it can get 
from fighting.  This gives B a better payoff than fighting (since B gets the equivalent of -
P+F from this deal instead of -P-C from fighting, and by construction F is greater than -
C). 
At node 3, A knows that if it chooses to mobilize it will get a payoff of D4-M, 
where D4 = P-F.  Its net payoff will therefore be equal to P-M-F.  So, A will choose to 
take the deal D2 as long as D2 is even trivially better than P-M-F.  (More precisely, an 
amount trivially better than an amount trivially better than P-M-F, a distinction that is 
unimportant for substantive interpretation.) 
At node 2, B wants to make an offer D2 that A will accept.  Why?  State A will 
accept D4 if it is at least P-F.  State A will accept D2, however, if it is at least P-F-M.  
That is, the minimum acceptable (to A) offer D2 is M less than the minimum acceptable 
offer D4.   
So, in equilibrium, state B at node 2 offers A a deal D2 that is trivially better than 
P-F-M.  Not only do the states never fight in this complete information game, but also 
state A never even mobilizes its military in the first place.   
Two straightforward implications merit further discussion.   
First, D4 > D2.  As a state mobilizes its military for war, its demand increases.  
This is a simple consequence of the fact that mobilization irretrievably sinks some of the 
costs of fighting, so that, once mobilized, a state is harder to buy off than it was before.  
If nothing else, then, this argument shows that military preparations for war influence the 
outcomes of interstate bargaining. 
Second, with complete information states never prepare for war.  If states all 
know what the costs of military mobilization would be, then they would never mobilize.  
For all of the same reasons that states that are fully informed, rational, and unitary never  
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fight wars (Fearon 1995), such states will also never prepare for war.  That is, they can 
anticipate exactly what effect that costly military preparations will have on the outcome 
of bargaining, and so they would jointly choose to avoid those costly preparations by 
choosing a settlement informed by their common knowledge of what the bargaining 
outcome would be, were they to arm themselves.   
This has a further implication for the study of international politics generally.  
Erik Gartzke (1998) demonstrates that to the extent that states are rational unitary actors 
for whom war is costly, scholars will never be able to precisely specify in advance the 
conditions under which states will fight wars.  Since wars are accidents, the best we can 
do is show instances in which accidents are unlikely; any indicators that a given war is 
inevitable would cause rational leaders to adjust their behavior to avert it.  The same 
logic, as my argument shows, applies to military mobilization.  By extension, of course, it 
applies to all sorts of military preparations.  In a world of states that are perfectly 
informed about what their military capabilities would be if they choose to develop them, 
no states would ever build militaries, and so no theory could ever completely account for 
militarization.  In Gartzke’s terms, not only is war in the error term, so are all armies as 
well.   
In the following three subsections I engage in some speculation about the 
potential effects of military mobilization when states are imperfectly informed.  These 
models are speculative, since the potentially interesting results – those having to do with 
the relationship between the costs of military mobilization and the probability of war – 
are sensitive to particular assumptions about the states’ prior beliefs and the information 
they have initially.  In three variations, I assume that A is perfectly informed throughout.  
B, however, can be poorly informed about M, about F, or about both.     
 
B is poorly informed about M 
Suppose that state B knows how costly A expects fighting to be but does not 
know how costly mobilization is for A.
3  That is, B knows F but it can only make a guess 
                                                                        
3 This situation, where B knows F but not M, seems intuitively implausible since costs 
over fighting are likely to be more uncertain than costs over mobilization.  There may be 
some situations, however, that come close.  Consider the 2001 crisis between the United  
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about M.  Formally, in the first move of the game Nature draws M from a uniform 
distribution ranging from Mlow to Mhigh and reveals that choice to A but not to B.  Even 
after state A mobilizes at node 3, B still does not observe how costly it was.  At node 5, A 
still chooses to accept B’s offer if D4 > P-F.  So, even in a situation where A mobilizes, B 
can (and will) always be able to avoid war by giving A enough of a concession at the last 
minute to make A choose to not fight.   
The question of when A will mobilize in the first place has a straightforward 
answer.  At node 3, A knows that if it mobilizes it will get a payoff of P-F-M – that is, the 
offer it gets from B at node 4 minus the costs of having mobilized.  So, it mobilizes if D2 
< P-F-M, otherwise it accepts the offer D2.  B knows that if it offers A a deal D2 = P-F-
Mlow then A is certain to accept.  If B makes an offer that is, say, halfway between P-F-
Mlow and P-F-Mhigh, then there is a .5 chance that A will accept and a .5 chance it will 
reject.  Since there is no updating in this model, B maximizes its payoff by setting D2 
somewhere between P-F-Mlow and P-F-Mhigh to maximize its payoff function, which is 
simply the probability that A will accept the offer D2 times the payoff to B of the offer 
plus the probably that A will reject the offer times the payoff to B of the final offer D4: 
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The point of this version of an incomplete information crisis bargaining game is 
to show that, even when the costs of ultimately fighting are known, there is some chance 
that states will still mobilize their militaries if there is uncertainty about the costs of 
mobilizing.  Interestingly, then, even if the cost of war is known, rational states may still 
prepare for war if there is incomplete information about states’ capabilities earlier in the 
chain of military preparations.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
States and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, where most of the uncertainty over the 
costliness to Americans of the war revolved around the costs of securing basing and 
overflight rights from Pakistan and the Central Asian Soviet successor states.    
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B is poorly informed about F 
A more realistic assumption, perhaps, is that B knows what cost A pays for 
mobilizing but does not know what cost A pays for fighting.  Formally, in the first move 
of the game Nature draws F from a uniform distribution ranging from Flow to Fhigh and 
reveals that choice to A but not to B.  In this version, there is the potential for state B to 
update its beliefs about A’s fighting costs by observing how A responds to B’s initial 
proposal D2. 
In this version, because B continues to be uncertain about the value of F at node 4 
when B makes its final offer, there is the potential for the states to fight a war.  As before, 
A accepts D4 if D4 > P-F.  At least under some payoff conditions, B will not necessarily 
tailor its offer so that A would prefer it to war for any possible value of F.  Rather, B will 
choose value a D4 to optimize between two goals of give smaller concessions to A and 
keeping the risk of war low.  Call the deal that B offers A in equilibrium at node 4 D4*.   
At node 2, B wants to keep its concession low, but it would also ideally like to 
have at least some chance that A will accept its offer.  As in the case with complete 
information, B is better off having A agree to a deal before A mobilizes, since A will 
demand less before mobilizing than after mobilizing.  Call the deal that B offers A in 
equilibrium at node 2 D2*.   
State B uses its offer at node 2 to try to buy off A before it mobilizes.  If that 
attempt fails, B has one more chance to make an offer at node 4.  Consider a strategy 
where B sets D4* > D2*.  That is, if B makes an offer to A and then A rejects it and 
mobilizes, B makes another offer to A that is more favorable to A than the one B 
originally offered.  This strategy seems reasonable for two reasons.  First, state A will 
always need a greater concession to avert war after it has mobilized, regardless of its cost 
of fighting, because mobilization costs will then be sunk.  Second, state A is more likely 
(or at least never less likely) to mobilize if its costs of fighting are lower. 
  In equilibrium, D4* = D2*+M.  To see why, begin by considering the conditions 
under which state A will bluff.  At node 2, B may make an offer that is more than enough 
to make A prefer taking the offer to mobilizing and fighting.  But, A may mobilize 
anyway, hoping that the later offer D4 may be even better for A even net of the costs of 
mobilizing.  That is, if D2* > P-M-F, A would rather take that deal than end up at the  
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node where it fights a war.  But if D4* is bigger than D2* by more than A’s cost of 
mobilizing, or D4* > D2*+M, A will reject D2* anyway.  Bluffing by mobilizing will 
eventually get A a better deal. 
  However, if D4* > D2*+M, then A will always reject the initial offer and hold out 
for more.  So, this value for D2* does not do anything useful for state B, since it does not 
help it separate out a type of A with high fighting costs that can be easily bought off.  
Therefore, D4* > D2*+M is not an equilibrium.   
  What about an equilibrium where D2*+M > D4* > D2*?  That is, B’s later offer is 
still bigger than its earlier offer, but it is bigger by less than the value of M.  This 
equilibrium would discourage A from bluffing, since A will always be worse off taking 
the deal after mobilizing than taking the deal before mobilizing.  For this reason, state A 
would never accept the second offer D4 if it rejected the first offer D2.  So, D2*+M > D4* 
cannot be an equilibrium, since B would be better off offering a greater concession at D4 
or a smaller initial offer at D2. 
  So, in this situation, the only equilibrium values of the deals B offers are such that 
D4* = D2*+M.  Here, state B sets D4* to maximize its payoff given, for D4, the 
probability that A will fight multiplied by B’s payoff to fighting, plus the probability that 
A will accept the deal multiplied by B’s payoff to the deal, or: 
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  In this case, the probability of a breakdown and war is not in any way influenced 
by either the size of the cost of mobilization or the uncertainty around it.  That is, the 
effect of sinking costs precisely offsets any effect of signaling; any information that is 
transmitted by the act of mobilization is rendered useless by the act itself.  
 
B is poorly informed about both M and F 
Finally, consider a game where B does not know with certainty either the cost A 
pays for mobilizing or the cost A pays for fighting.  Formally, in the first move of the 
game Nature draws F from a uniform distribution ranging from Flow to Fhigh, draws M  
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from a uniform distribution ranging from Mlow to Mhigh, and reveals both of these choices 
to A but not to B.  Assume that F and M are drawn independently (that is, they are 
uncorrelated).
4   
It remains the case that D4* > D2* for all the same reasons as before.  However, 
now that B does not know M, it cannot set D4* = D2*+M with certainty.  Therefore, there 
is the possibility that A might bluff, especially if it draws a low mobilization cost but a 
high war cost, since B might increase its offer from D2 to D4 by more than the cost of 
mobilization.  There is also the possibility that, as a hedge against bluffing, B might 
increase its offer by less than the cost of mobilization, meaning that the states could be 
essentially doomed to fight from the instant A rejects B’s first offer and mobilizes.   
Consider B’s choice at node 4.  As in the previous version, state B sets D4* to 
maximize its payoff.  It optimizes between the two goals of making an offer that is bettor 
for itself (by making less of a concession) and making an offer that will keep the risk of 
war low (by making more of a concession).  Its optimization problem here different from 
the one in the previous section, however, because the first several moves – its earlier 
offer that A can accept or reject – may change B’s expectations about A’s likely costs of 
fighting.  That is, B wants to maximize its payoff by choosing an offer D4 that maximizes 
the probability that A will accept the deal given that it has chosen to mobilize multiplied 
by B’s payoff to the deal, plus the probability that A will reject the deal given that it has 
chosen to mobilize multiplied by B’s payoff to fighting, or: 
 
() [] () ( ) [] () C P M F P D pr D M F P D pr − − − < + − − ≥ | | 4 4 4     
 
To what extent can B’s initial offer, D2, act as a screening mechanism to help it 
calibrate its final offer D4?  If B makes a very low offer at node 2, then A will always 
reject it and B will be no better off, while if B makes a high offer at node 2 then A will 
always accept it and B will also be no better off.   
                                                                        
4 In another possible variation, M and F could be correlated with each other.  This might 
be realistic if both M and F are themselves partly functions of some other common 
variable such as the extent to which state A subjectively values the good the states are 
bargaining over.    
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Consider a strategy where B sets D4* = D2*+Mmid, where Mmid is the midpoint 
between Mlow to Mhigh (that is, the ex ante expected value of M).  There are two different 
motives for A to mobilize under in this situation.  First, state A will choose to mobilize 
whenever its actual cost of mobilizing is less than Mmid.  This is because A will always 
get an offer at node 4 that is better for it by more than the cost of mobilizing, so 
mobilizing pays off even if A has no interest in actually fighting.  So, A’s interest in 
mobilizing in this situation is completely independent of its cost of fighting. 
The second motive, however, does depend on the relative costs of mobilizing and 
fighting.  Suppose that the range of possible fighting costs, from Flow to Fhigh, is much 
higher than the range of possible mobilization costs, from Mlow to Mhigh, and that A draws 
a relatively high value of mobilization costs but a low value of fighting costs.  That is, 
while M<F, M is still more than B might initially expect and F is less than B might 
initially expect.  If the states are in a situation where B optimizes at node 5 by choosing a 
final offer that is less than what A would prefer to war, and since A will be able to 
anticipate B’s equilibrium strategy in advance, A may know from the beginning that it 
will mobilize and then fight because B’s offer will not be big enough.   
This motive is most likely to be present when the possible range of M is low 
relative to the possible range of F.  The larger the range of possible mobilization costs, 
the more mobilization costs play a role in deterring A from fighting, since mobilization in 
the first place is more expensive.  Higher possible ranges of M mean that a bad draw on 
M provides more of a disincentive for A to fight. 
So, when B sees A mobilize, it knows there is some chance that A mobilized 
because its mobilization costs were low.  The higher the range of possible mobilization 
costs is relative to the range of possible fighting costs, though, the more there is the 
possibility (from B’s perspective) that A mobilized because it actually plans to fight, 
despite its high mobilization costs, because A has a lower cost of fighting. 
So, all else equal, it might seem that the more fighting costs are greater than 
mobilization costs, the more B would be better off by increasing its final offer D4 to be 
greater than D2 by more than Mmid.  That is, when fighting costs are greater than 
mobilization costs, B lowers its estimate of state A’s fighting costs given that A has 
chosen to mobilize.  Furthermore, the greater the difference between fighting and  
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mobilization costs, the more B will lower its guess about A’s fighting costs.  So, all else 
equal, B would be better off raising its offer D4 to be greater than D2*+Mmid when 
fighting costs are greater than mobilization costs, and the additional increase in D4 should 
be greater the greater the difference in fighting and mobilization costs.  This, after all, 
would make B better off since it would make use of information it learns from the 
rejection of its initial offer.  So, low mobilization costs relative to fighting costs could 
reduce the probability of war eventually breaking out by helping B better to tailor its final 
offer. 
Unfortunately for B, not all else is equal.  The greater the difference between D2 
and D4, the more likely it is that state A will mobilize because it has a low (or now even 
an intermediate) mobilization cost and just wants to take advantage of the possibilities of 
bluffing.  That would, in turn, reduce the informative effects of mobilization as a signal, 
which would cause B to bring D4 back down again.  So, low mobilization costs relative to 
fighting costs could instead actually increase the probability of war eventually breaking 
out by hopelessly muddying the informative signal that mobilization sends, reducing B’s 
ability to tailor its final offer. 
Because of the players’ uncertainties around mobilization and fighting costs, there 
is no guarantee that the signaling and cost-sinking effects of mobilization will exactly 
cancel each other out, as they did in the version where B is only uncertain about F but not 
M.  The size of the difference between fighting and mobilization costs can therefore 
change the probability of a bargaining breakdown and war.   
On balance, do higher mobilization costs relative to fighting costs increase or 
decrease the chances of war?  Without further assumptions, the answer is unclear.  At a 
minimum, the answer would depend on how wide the range of uncertainty B has about 
A’s costs, the extent to which B values getting a better for itself versus avoiding the costs 
of fighting, and A’s willingness to risk war in order to get a better deal for itself.  Each 
additional assumption required to get a clearer answer reduces the extent to which the 
model can usefully be applied to the general problem of bargaining, which is why I see 
this result as speculative.  On some level, though, it seems that with imperfect 
information the relative size of mobilization and fighting costs could influence the 
probability of war, even if it is unclear how.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
  The argument I propose in this paper is that when costly military mobilization 
reduces the marginal costs of war a state faces if it later has to fight, mobilization changes 
the nature of the last-minute bargaining that states might engage in as they try to avert 
war.  Specifically, as a country mobilizes, its demands increase.  Even though 
mobilization might provide information to an opponent about a state’s resolve, and can 
thereby help states resolve a crisis with a mutually-preferred settlement, a cost-sinking 
effect might sometimes outweigh the signaling effect and cancel out any useful 
information that is transmitted.  In a speculative discussion of bargaining when there is 
uncertainty about these two costs, I suggested that the overall size of mobilization costs 
relative to fighting costs might influence the probability that the states end up in war, 
although the direction of causality is not clear without further assumptions. 
  Given changes in the distribution of capabilities in the world, many crises the U.S. 
is likely to face will be with states in which the actual costs of fighting are likely to be 
low relative to mobilization costs.  Thus, questions about the cost sinking effect of 
military mobilization are probably worth asking.  My argument suggests some possible 
reasons why the structure of mobilization could influence the onset of wars, a relationship 
that might be profitably explored with future empirical work. 
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Figure 2: The effects of mobilization on bargaining.
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Suppose B (mistakenly) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer that A finds unacceptable:
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A rejects B’s offer by escalating.  B learns something about the boundaries of the minimal deal A 
will accept.  Since A also pays the mobilization costs of war, the remaining cost of war for A 
shrinks and the bargaining range contracts.
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Figure 3: Extensive Form